

## **INFLATION EXPECTATIONS, TARGET. AND (ALMOST) NOTHING ELSE MATTERS**

**Mauricio Oreng**  
mauricio.oreng@santander.com.br  
+5511 3553 5404

- The Copom once again hiked the Selic policy rate by 150 bps, reaching 9.25%. This was the seventh move in this cycle, as the Selic now stands at the highest level since 3Q17. The decision itself was in line with the consensus of macro analysts and the yield-curve pricing, even though some market participants seem to have been surprised by the more hawkish than expected tone from the BCB (which we saw as warranted).
- In a communiqué with few changes from the previous one, the Copom claims that “given the increase in its inflation projections and in the risk of a deanchoring of long-term expectations, it is appropriate to advance the process of monetary tightening significantly into the restrictive territory.” Importantly, the BCB board also pledges to “persist in its strategy until the disinflation process and the expectation anchoring around its targets consolidate.” The focus on expectations is quite clear.
- In our view, the Copom came up with a classical response by a central bank operating under an inflation targeting regime: as inflation expectations keep diverging from the targets for the short, medium and longer horizons, the authority suggests it will not tolerate the fading of its main policy objective, which is to put inflation expectations at the target. With the slowing activity having limited influence on expectations for now, we believe the BCB focused on the right elements. Yet, given the different (i.e., expansionary) gears seen from the fiscal levers, it will not be an easy task for the BCB to rein in inflation expectations. But they are trying, as they should.
- As per our scenario, we continue to forecast two more hikes of 150bps for the Copom meetings in 1Q22, as we interpret the BCB models signaling room for a rate tightening through 12%. Especially if one takes into account the upwardly skewed balance of risks. For now, we look for a terminal Selic of 12.25% for the cycle. But that forecast hinges on inflation expectations, especially the ones seen in the BCB’s Focus survey, which takes on added relevance for the coming weeks and months.



## Policy decision and signals

In its 243rd meeting, the Copom<sup>1</sup> once again hiked the Selic policy rate by 150 bps, reaching 9.25%<sup>2</sup>. This was the seventh move in this cycle, and the Selic rate now stands at the highest level since 3Q17.

The decision itself was in line with the consensus of macro analysts and the yield-curve pricing, even though some market participants seem to have been surprised by the more hawkish than expected tone from the BCB (which we saw as warranted).

In a communiqué with few major changes from the previous one (issued in October 26-27), the Copom claims that “given the increase in its inflation projections and in the risk of a deanchoring of long-term expectations, it is appropriate to advance the process of monetary tightening significantly into the restrictive territory.” Importantly, the BCB board also pledges to “persist in its strategy until the disinflation process and the expectation anchoring around its targets consolidate.”

With words and actions, the Copom comes up with a classical response by a central bank operating under an inflation targeting regime. As inflation expectations keep diverging from the targets for the short, medium and longer horizons, the authority suggests it will not tolerate the deterioration of its main policy objective: putting inflation expectations (back) at the targeted path<sup>3</sup>.

Interestingly, market expectations about the next BCB steps were apparently taking a U-turn in recent days after a batch of some weak economic activity reports. Yet the BCB mentioned in the statement that “growth indicators released since the last meeting once more posted an evolution moderately below expected.”

While that sounds a much milder downgrade in the activity assessment than the markets seemed to anticipate, that should have not come as a surprise. Firstly, because the BCB has been running for long a below-consensus GDP projection for this year, ranging around 4.6-4.7% of late, according the last two inflation reports<sup>4</sup>. Secondly, in a study (box) presented in the Q2 inflation report, the BCB addresses the uncertainty generated by the pandemic on the seasonal adjustment and advises against extrapolating too far out the strong seasonally adjusted GDP growth seen in Q1<sup>5</sup>.

In the Copom statement, the BCB kept the phrasing that “doubts regarding the fiscal framework increase the risk of deanchoring inflation expectations, keeping the upward asymmetry in the balance of risks. This implies a higher probability of inflation paths above the one projected under the baseline scenario.” The authority also continued to focus on inflation convergence to the targets at the relevant horizon, with the latter meaning 2022 and 2023 (with similar weights, apparently). No change in the framework announced, as some had believed.

The BCB kept providing signals about the flight plan, as the authority “foresees another adjustment of the same magnitude” (i.e. 150bps, to 10.75%) for the next meeting (February 1-2). As any central bank, the BCB shows the usual disclaimers that “future policy steps could be adjusted to ensure the convergence of inflation towards its targets and will depend on the evolution of economic activity, on the balance of risks, and on inflation expectations and projections for the relevant horizon for monetary policy.” In any case, the signal is that a slowdown in the pace of hikes is likely not on the cards for February. And maybe even for March either.

The inflation simulations provide a clue as per how deep into “restrictive territory” the BCB could be planning to reach, and for how long the pace of 150bps could remain in place. Judging from the numbers, we estimate the Copom’s flight plan could include a terminal Selic rate above 12%. The BCB inflation simulations use as main inputs an FX rate starting at 5.65 (as per the rounded average of last week) and moving along with PPP afterward, as well as a path of Selic rate hikes (as projected by economists<sup>6</sup>) to 9.25% for YE2021 and a terminal rate of 11.75%, prevailing for most of 2022, and then landing at 11.25% by YE2022, and falling to

<sup>1</sup> The Copom is the monetary policy committee of the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB).

<sup>2</sup> Refer to the statement of Copom #243 in English (<https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/monetarypolicy/Copomstatements>).

<sup>3</sup> As Svensson (2010) puts it, an inflation targeting regime is a monetary policy strategy that “gives a major role to an inflation forecast”, to the point that it can be called a “forecast targeting.” Handbook of Monetary Economics, Volume 3, Chapter 22 - Inflation Targeting, Pages 1237-1302.

<sup>4</sup> Refer to <https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/publications/inflationreportboxes>.

<sup>5</sup> Refer to <https://www.bcb.gov.br/content/ri/inflationreport/202106/ri202106b2i.pdf>.

<sup>6</sup> Refer to the BCB’s weekly survey of professional forecasters for December 3, 2021 (<https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/publications/focusmarketreadout>)



8.00% for YE2023<sup>7</sup>. According to the BCB's own models, the aforementioned monetary policy path would produce the following IPCA inflation trajectory: 10.2% for 2021 (previously: 9.5%; mid target: 3.75%; upper target: 5.25%), 4.7% for 2022 (previously: 4.1%; mid target: 3.50%; upper target: 5.00%) and 3.2% for 2023 (previously: 3.1%; mid target: 3.25%).

Based on the standard BCB model elasticities, we calculate that, in order to bring down the inflation forecast to the (adjusted) mid-target for 3Q23<sup>8</sup>, meaning a decline of about 0.3 pp in an interval of over a year, it would take an additional Selic adjustment of about 50-75bps in comparison with the simulated scenario. That number does not take into account the upwardly skewed balance of risks, which imply a need for an even tighter policy stance, as the BCB admits.

### **Balance of risks and scenario assessment**

No new elements were added in the balance of risks assessment. The BCB still views elements in both directions. To the upside, the Copom sees “further extensions of fiscal policy responses to the pandemic that increase aggregate demand and deteriorate the fiscal path may pressure the country's risk premium.” To the downside, the Copom believes that “a possible reversion, even if partial, of the recent increase in the price of international commodities measured in local currency would produce a lower-than-projected inflation in the baseline scenario.”

In the scenario assessment, the BCB once again recognizes a tough inflation environment, admitting that CPI “remains high” and that price increases were “higher than expected, both in the more volatile components and on the items associated with core inflation”. The Copom also sees key core inflation gauges running “above the range compatible with meeting the inflation target.”

On the global environment, the BCB has also recognized a more difficult environment for emerging economies. The BCB notes that some key central banks “expressed more clearly the need for caution given the increased persistence of inflation.” The authority also mentions that the risk of new waves of contagion in the pandemic “add uncertainty about the pace of recovery” in advanced economies.

### **What to Expect Ahead?**

In our view, the BCB once again brought a well-suited response for an increasingly challenging environment for monetary policy. With the evidence of a deep contraction in future activity being scant (to say the least), and with the incoming activity number being apparently insufficient to reverse the course of inflation expectations, which remain on the rise for key horizons, the BCB's decision and policy signal in the communiqué focused on the right elements, in our view.

Given the different (i.e., more expansionary) gears seen from the fiscal levers, it will not be an easy task for the BCB to rein in inflation expectations. But the key signal here is that they are trying, as hard as they can.

As per our scenario, we continue to forecast two more hikes of 150bps for the Copom meetings in 1Q22. For now, we take these as the probably final moves in the cycle, leading to a terminal Selic of 12.25%. While the speed of monetary adjustment is now looking more consolidated (at least for February), the total budget of hikes may now be the moving part. And that could still increase, conditional on the trends in inflation expectations, especially the ones seen in the Focus analysts' survey. That report naturally takes on added relevance for the coming weeks and months. Uncertainty remains high, that's for sure.


***Refer to a few graphs in the next page.***

<sup>7</sup> According to the Focus survey, the trajectory of the Selic rate projected by analysts include another hike of 150bps in February 2022, with a 75-bp move in March 2022 and a final 25-bp hike in May 2022. Cuts projected for October and December 2022 (25bps each).

<sup>8</sup> This expresses the BCB's claim that “the relevant horizon for monetary policy (...) includes 2022 and 2023”. In 1Q22, the BCB's own rule of thumb for the “rolling horizon” indicates that 2022 will have a weight of 25%, with 2023 prevailing with 75%. In calendar terms, this means 3Q23.




**Figure 1.A. – The Path for the Nominal Selic Rate (monthly average, % p.a.)**




Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Bloomberg, Santander.

**Figure 1.B. – Selic Rate Moves in Copom Meetings (in percentage points)**




Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Bloomberg, Santander.

**Figure 2.A. – Median Selic Rate Forecasts (Monthly)**




Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.  
 Note: Based on BCB's weekly Focus survey with professional forecasters (refer to <https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/publications/focusmarketreadout>).

**Figure 2.B. – Median Consensus Selic Forecasts**




Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.  
 Note: Based on BCB's weekly Focus survey with professional forecasters (refer to <https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/publications/focusmarketreadout>).

**Figure 3.A. – BCB's Inflation Simulations**



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.  
 Note: Simulations assume Selic rate from the Focus survey and USD/BRL starting at 5.65 and evolving according to purchase power parity.

**Figure 3.B. – Median Consensus IPCA Forecasts**



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.  
 Note: Based on BCB's weekly Focus survey with professional forecasters (refer to <https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/publications/focusmarketreadout>).



## CONTACTS / IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES

### Brazil Macro Research

Ana Paula Vescovi*	Chief Economist	anavescovi@santander.com.br	5511-3553-8567
Mauricio Oreng*	Head of Macro Research	mauricio.oreng@santander.com.br	5511-3553-5404
Jankiel Santos*	Economist – External Sector	jankiel.santos@santander.com.br	5511-3012-5726
Ítalo Franca*	Economist – Fiscal Policy	italo.franca@santander.com.br	5511-3553-5235
Daniel Karp*	Economist – Inflation	daniel.karp@santander.com.br	5511-3553-9828
Tomas Urani*	Economist – Global Economics	tomas.urani@santander.com.br	5511-3553-9520
Lucas Maynard*	Economist – Economic Activity	lucas.maynard.da.silva@santander.com.br	5511-3553-7495
Felipe Kotinda*	Economist – Credit	felipe.kotinda@santander.com.br	5511-3553-8071
Gabriel Couto*	Economist – Special Projects	gabriel.couto@santander.com.br	5511-3553-8487
Gilmar Lima*	Economist – Modeling	gilmar.lima@santander.com.br	5511-3553-6327

### Global Macro Research

Maciej Reluga*	Head Macro, Rates & FX Strategy – CEE	maciej.reluga@santander.pl	48-22-534-1888
Juan Cerruti *	Senior Economist – Argentina	jcerruti@santander.com.ar	54 11 4341 1272
Ana Paula Vescovi*	Economist – Brazil	anavescovi@santander.com.br	5511-3553-8567
Juan Pablo Cabrera*	Economist – Chile	jcabrera@santander.cl	562-2320-3778
Guillermo Aboumrad*	Economist – Mexico	gjaboumrad@santander.com.mx	5255-5257-8170
Piotr Bielski*	Economist – Poland	piotr.bielski@santander.pl	48-22-534-1888
Mike Moran	Head of Macro Research, US	mike.moran@santander.us	212-350-3500

### Fixed Income Research

Juan Arranz*	Chief Rates & FX Strategist – Argentina	jarranz@santanderrio.com.ar	5411-4341-1065
Mauricio Oreng*	Senior Economist/Strategist – Brazil	mauricio.oreng@santander.com.br	5511-3553-5404
Juan Pablo Cabrera*	Chief Rates & FX Strategist – Chile	jcabrera@santander.cl	562-2320-3778

### Equity Research

Miguel Machado*	Head Equity Research Americas	mmachado@santander.com.mx	5255 5269 2228
Alan Alanis*	Head, Mexico	aalanis@santander.com.mx	5552-5269-2103
Andres Soto	Head, Andean	asoto@santander.us	212-407-0976
Claudia Benavente*	Head, Chile	claudia.benavente@santander.cl	562-2336-3361
Walter Chiarvesio*	Head, Argentina	wchiarvesio@santanderrio.com.ar	5411-4341-1564
Mariana Cahen Margulies*	Head, Brazil	mmargulies@santander.com.br	5511 3553 1684

### Electronic

Bloomberg  
Reuters

SIEQ <GO>  
Pages SISEMA through SISEMZ

This report has been prepared by Santander Investment Securities Inc. ("SIS"; SIS is a subsidiary of Santander Holdings USA, Inc. which is wholly owned by Banco Santander, S.A. "Santander"), on behalf of itself and its affiliates (collectively, Grupo Santander) and is provided for information purposes only. This document must not be considered as an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any relevant securities (i.e., securities mentioned herein or of the same issuer and/or options, warrants, or rights with respect to or interests in any such securities). Any decision by the recipient to buy or to sell should be based on publicly available information on the related security and, where appropriate, should take into account the content of the related prospectus filed with and available from the entity governing the related market and the company issuing the security. This report is issued in Spain by Santander Investment Bolsa, Sociedad de Valores, S.A. ("Santander Investment Bolsa"), and in the United Kingdom by Banco Santander, S.A., London Branch. Santander London is authorized by the Bank of Spain. This report is not being issued to private customers. SIS, Santander London and Santander Investment Bolsa are members of Grupo Santander.

**ANALYST CERTIFICATION:** The following analysts hereby certify that their views about the companies and their securities discussed in this report are accurately expressed, that their recommendations reflect solely and exclusively their personal opinions, and that such opinions were prepared in an independent and autonomous manner, including as regards the institution to which they are linked, and that they have not received and will not receive direct or indirect compensation in exchange for expressing specific recommendations or views in this report, since their compensation and the compensation system applying to Grupo Santander and any of its affiliates is not pegged to the pricing of any of the securities issued by the companies evaluated in the report, or to the income arising from the businesses and financial transactions carried out by Grupo Santander and any of its affiliates: **Mauricio Oreng\***.

\*Employed by a non-US affiliate of Santander Investment Securities Inc. and not registered/qualified as a research analyst under FINRA rules, and is not an associated person of the member firm, and, therefore, may not be subject to the FINRA Rule 2242 and Incorporated NYSE Rule 472 restrictions on communications with a subject company, public appearances, and trading securities held by a research analyst account.

The information contained herein has been compiled from sources believed to be reliable, but, although all reasonable care has been taken to ensure that the information contained herein is not untrue or misleading, we make no representation that it is accurate or complete and it should not be relied upon as such. All opinions and estimates included herein constitute our judgment as at the date of this report and are subject to change without notice.

Any U.S. recipient of this report (other than a registered broker-dealer or a bank acting in a broker-dealer capacity) that would like to effect any transaction in any security discussed herein should contact and place orders in the United States with SIS, which, without in any way limiting the foregoing, accepts responsibility (solely for purposes of and within the meaning of Rule 15a-6 under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934) for this report and its dissemination in the United States.

© 2021 by Santander Investment Securities Inc. All Rights Reserved.