

## BRAZIL MACRO MONETARY POLICY DECISION

### PUSHING BACK EXPECTED RATE CUTS

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- In its 252<sup>nd</sup> Copom meeting, the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) again maintained the Selic policy rate at 13.75%, as widely expected.
- While we already expected a little tightening in the tone of the BCB, the Copom statement turned out to be more hawkish than we had been looking for. In terms of policy signals, the BCB clearly upped the tone further on the inflation risks, as fiscal uncertainties remain high and inflation expectations keep rising and drifting further away from the path of the mid-point targets. The BCB believes that "this scenario raises the cost of the disinflation that is needed to reach the targets established by the National Monetary Council."
- Overall, the latest developments have made the BCB much less confident that the path for the Selic rate as projected by analysts (interest rate on hold at 13.75% until September, then falling to 12.50% for YE2023 and 9.50% for YE2024) will suffice to assure inflation convergence to the target. The official inflation forecasts now send this very signal, showing a clear deterioration from the previous publication (December), driven mainly by the increase in inflation expectations.
- The BCB also adjusted its policy wording by claiming now that it will continue to assess "if the strategy of maintaining the Selic rate for a **longer period than in the reference scenario** will be enough to ensure the convergence of inflation."
- The Copom minutes, out next Tuesday (February 7), may shed further light on the BCB's scenario assessment and policy strategy. Judging from the tone of the statement, the BCB now seems to envisage a strategy of holding interest rates steady for even longer, in a response to the fiscal risks and spillovers (of the whole economic policy debate) on inflation expectations.
- For many months, we have been forecasting the YE2023 Selic rate at 12.00%, which happened to be an above-consensus call for quite some time until December (but not anymore, of course). There is little doubt that the odds are for the start of rate cuts to take even longer and for the whole eventual easing process to unfold much more slowly than previously thought.

### A.

#### POLICY DECISION AND FLIGHT PLAN

In the 252<sup>nd</sup> monetary policy meeting of the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB), the Copom<sup>1</sup> kept the Selic rate at 13.75%<sup>2</sup>. The decision was in line with analysts' forecasts<sup>3</sup> and the yield curve.

The Copom statement turned out to be even more hawkish than we expected. In terms of policy signals, the BCB clearly upped the tone on the inflation risks, as fiscal uncertainties remain high and inflation expectations keep rising and moving further away from the path of the mid-point targets, both for the medium and long run. Judging from the BCB's tone, these elements are likely making the authority much less confident that the path for the Selic rate as projected by analysts<sup>4</sup> (with interest rate on-hold at 13.75% until September, then falling to 12.50% for YE2023 and 9.50% for YE2024) will suffice to assure the inflation convergence to the mid-targets trajectory. The authority took the opportunity to reaffirm its commitment with the inflation targets (3.25% for 2023 and 3.00% for 2024: the latter is now the most important year-end horizon for the BCB).

**The official inflation forecasts**<sup>s</sup> **showed a clear deterioration from the previous publication (December), driven mainly by the increase in inflation expectations.** The BCB now estimates IPCA inflation at 5.6% for 2023 (previously 5.0%; consensus: 5.7%), and at 3.6% for 3Q24 (the key policy horizon as of now, using the BCB's rule of thumb for six-quarters ahead; in December the BCB estimated 3.3% for 3Q24). Inflation is seen by the BCB at 3.4% for 2024 (previously 3.0%; consensus: 3.9%) assuming the aforementioned consensus path for the Selic rate.

The BCB introduced another type of simulation (widely used in the past), assuming a stable path for the Selic rate at 13.75% for the entire forecasting horizon: this simulation yields an IPCA estimate of 5.5% for 2023, 3.1% for the 3Q24, and 2.8% for 2024. By presenting this alternative simulation, the BCB possibly intends to show us that, in their models, a path with no Selic cuts until 2024YE takes IPCA much closer to their objectives, as compared to the current consensus path for the Selic rate.

Given the numbers, it is no wonder that the BCB concludes that the conditions (especially when it comes to fiscal policy and inflation expectations) "requires further attention when evaluating risks." The BCB goes on saying that "this scenario raises the cost of the disinflation that is needed to reach the targets established by the National Monetary Council." The BCB also "reaffirms its commitment to set monetary policy to meet the targets." The BCB also adjusted its previous language by claiming it will continue to assess if "if the strategy of maintaining the Selic rate <u>for a longer period than in the reference scenario</u> will be enough to ensure the convergence of inflation." The emphasized words replaced the previous plan of a stable Selic rate <u>"for a sufficiently long period</u>".

Reaffirming its commitment not only to the disinflation process but also to the process of re-anchoring expectations, the Copom notes that inflation expectations "have shown deterioration at longer horizons since the previous meeting." The BCB also continued to claim that "future monetary policy steps can be adjusted" and that it "will not hesitate to resume the tightening cycle if the disinflationary process does not proceed as expected".

#### **BALANCE OF RISKS, SCENARIO ASSESSMENT**

Despite the lack of major changes in the balance of risk analysis, the aforementioned policy signal sent by the BCB -- with the Copom considering now a flight plan for the Selic rate implying a tighter path compared to the consensus – is probably an implicit signal that the upside inflationary risks are prevailing (on the downside risks), probably generating an asymmetry in the perceived outlook. Still

(https://www.bcb.gov.br/controleinflacao/comunicadoscopom).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Copom is the monetary policy committee of the Brazilian Central Bank.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Refer to the statement of Copom #252 in English (https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/monetarypolicy/Copomstatements) and Portuguese

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Santander Brazil Monetary Policy: "Copom Preview: Eyeing the Balance of Risks" – January 30, 2023 – Available on: https://bit.ly/Std-COPOM-p-feb23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Refer to the last BCB's Focus survey among professional forecasters, as of January 27, 2023

<sup>(</sup>https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/publications/focusmarketreadout)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The simulations assume USD/BRL at 5.15 and then evolving with the purchasing power parity (PPP) as well as oil price following the futures curve for the next six months and then stable in real terms in USD. The scenarios assume energy tariff flag "yellow" for both December 2023 and 2024.

the BCB apparently chose not to explicitly refer to the netting out of upside and downside inflation risks, at least for now. As per the composition of the future CPI risks, the BCB continues to view as upside risks i) "greater persistence of global inflationary pressures", ii) "heightened uncertainty about the country's future fiscal framework and fiscal stimuli that support aggregate demand" and iii) "an output gap tighter than the one currently adopted by the Committee". On the opposite side, i) further declines in commodity prices, ii) an even slower global activity and iii) "the continuity of tax cuts assumed to be reversed in 2023" are seen as downside risks.

Elsewhere in the statement, the scenario assessment portraits the BCB a bit more sanguine (or, better said, less bearish) on the global developments, as "recent global activity data has shown some resilience", and the BCB believes that the "relaxation of sanitary restrictions in the Chinese economy attenuates the possibility of new global supply chain disruptions". Still, the "global environment continues to be adverse and volatile", amid persistent global inflation ("despite more positive signs at the margin"), tight monetary policy in DMs, and expectations of below-potential global growth.

The authority still sees the local activity data confirming the Copom's scenario of slower demand growth going forward. On inflation, while highlighting some moderation in CPI of late, the BCB affirms that "consumer inflation as well as the various measures of underlying inflation are above the range compatible with meeting the inflation target."


#### WHAT TO EXPECT AHEAD?

Next Tuesday's Copom minutes will likely shed further light on the BCB's scenario assessment, perceived risks, and policy strategy. Judging from the tone of the statement, the BCB is now envisaging a strategy of holding interest rates steady for even longer (than previously thought), given the fiscal risks and the spillovers (of the whole economic policy debate) in inflation expectations.

For many months, we have been forecasting YE2023 Selic rate at 12.00%, which happened to be an aboveconsensus call for a long period until December (but not anymore, of course). We sense **there is little doubt that the odds are for the start of rate cuts to take even longer and for the whole eventual easing process to unfold much more slowly than previously thought.** 

#### Refer to graphs on the next page.

# Figure 1. The Path for the Selic Policy Rate (monthly average, % p.a.)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Bloomberg, Santander.





Figure 3. Median Annual IPCA Forecasts (Consensus)

Note: Based on BCB's weekly Focus survey with professional forecasters (refer to https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/publications/focusmarketreadout).


# Figure 5. BCB's Inflation Estimates (% Annual IPCA) – Reference Scenario



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.

Note: Assuming FX rate departing from USD/BRL 5.15, and then moving along with the PPP (purchasing power parity). Oil price following the futures curve for six months and stable in real terms in USD. Uses consensus forecast for the future path of interest rate.

## Figure 2. Selic Rate Moves in Copom Meetings: History and Forecast (in percentage points)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Bloomberg, Santander.




Figure 4. Median Annual Selic Forecasts (Consensus)

Note: Based on BCB's weekly Focus survey with professional forecasters (refer to https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/publications/focusmarketreadout).

Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.

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