

**BRAZIL MONETARY POLICY**

**COPOM Minutes: Clues on When to Drop the Forward Guidance**

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- The Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) published the minutes of its December 8-9 policy meeting. The authority provided more information on the conditioners for the planned dropping of the forward guidance (of stable interest rates under certain conditions) sometime soon, as signaled in the COPOM statement last week;
- The end of the forward guidance could follow: (i) an eventual increase of 2021 inflation expectations toward the mid-target; or (ii) the switching of the policy horizon from YE2021 (when inflation is seen below the target with stable Selic next year) to YE2022 (when inflation is seen at the target, but only with Selic hikes next year);
- Since we believe the natural change of policy horizon is the most likely candidate to prompt the adjustment in the BCB's flight plan, and given that the first meeting of the year is historically too soon to change the horizon, we believe the March COPOM is a stronger candidate (than January) for the end of the forward guidance.
- In any case, we see the BCB setting the stage for the elimination of the forward guidance sometime in 1H21 and believe this could mean risks of slightly sooner rate hikes than we have been expecting (our baseline scenario used to have Selic hikes only in 2022).

**Key Policy Takeaways from the Minutes**

The BCB published minutes<sup>1</sup> from its December 8-9 COPOM policy meeting, when the authority kept the Selic policy rate (for a third meeting) at the historical low of 2.00%.

The focus of the policy discussion remains on the forward guidance, whereby the BCB has been signaling the intention not to “reduce the monetary stimulus as long as specified conditions are met<sup>2</sup>.” The authority continues to pave the way for the removal of the forward guidance at some point ahead, since the conditions for it may not continue to hold in the near future, according to the minutes.

In paragraph 21, the COPOM addresses this topic. The authority claims that “inflation expectations reverted their declining trend relative to the target for the relevant horizon”, since the introduction of the forward guidance. Additionally, the authority claims that “the 2021 calendar-year should become less relevant than the 2022 calendar-year, for which projections and expected inflation are around the target”. The COPOM reaffirms the message that “inflation expectations converging to the target suggests that the conditions for maintaining the forward guidance may soon no longer apply.”

Importantly, the authority continues to indicate that the dropping of the forward guidance “does not mechanically imply interest rate increases, since economic conditions still prescribe an extraordinarily strong monetary stimulus”. The subsequent policy steps after aborting the guidance will be data dependent (i.e., based on the evolution of the inflation outlook and balance of risks).

In paragraph 17, the COPOM discusses on the conditioners for the scrapping of the forward guidance, based on the clause of inflation expectations gap vis-à-vis the mid-target. Two possibilities are mentioned: (i) a rise in inflation expectations for 2021 (currently at 3.34%) toward the mid-target (3.75%); or (ii) a switch of the relevant policy horizon from YE2021 toward

<sup>1</sup> Refer to the COPOM minutes in English version (<https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/publications/copomminutes>).

<sup>2</sup> For the time being, according to paragraphs #14 and #20 of the COPOM minutes, conditions for keeping the forward guidance still apply. The BCB states that despite “having increased since the last meeting, in particular for 2021, inflation expectations, as well as inflation projections for its baseline scenario, are still below the inflation target for the relevant horizon for monetary policy; the current fiscal regime has not been changed; and long-term inflation expectations remain well anchored.”

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YE2022, a horizon for which the BCB states that “expectations and projections are, at this moment, close enough to the target.”

In our view, these two possibilities give us clues on the possible timing for the removal of the forward guidance next year, leading us to believe March is more likely than January. Firstly, analyzing alternatives: Alternative #1: Regarding expectations for 2021, we see limited possibilities that median IPCA projections of the Focus report<sup>3</sup> for next year will head toward 3.75%<sup>4</sup>, especially given the increased signs of softening in the food price shock (according to daily price monitors) and the likely removal of emergency fiscal stimulus. In our view, this rules out Alternative #1 as a driver for the removal of the forward guidance.

As per Alternative #2, dealing with the shift in the policy horizon from 2021 to 2022, it is important to bear in mind that the first COPOM meeting of each year is historically too soon for a change in the policy horizon. In 2019 and 2020, the current calendar-years were still the focal horizon in the first COPOM meeting, with a gradual transition taking place in the second COPOM meeting and a final change taking place in the third COPOM meeting. Thus, Alternative #2 for the dropping of the forward guidance is more likely to apply for the second COOPM policy meeting of the year (March 16-17) rather than the first one (January 19-20).

Even though the forward guidance is about to expire soon, the COPOM keeps details on the interpretation of the fiscal clause of its forward guidance, which shows the conditions for the strategy of no rate hikes based to the maintenance of the fiscal regime (paragraph 16). The BCB once again stated that “changes in fiscal policy that affect public debt trajectory, or compromise the fiscal anchor, would motivate a reassessment, even if the spending ceiling in nominal terms is still maintained”. This reassessment “would follow the usual guidance of an inflation targeting regime, based on prospective inflation and its balance of risks.”

In the minutes, the COPOM also continues to signal that it “deemed adequate the current level of monetary stimulus, which is being provided by the maintenance of the policy rate at 2.00% p.a. and by the forward guidance” (paragraph 15).

### **On the Scenario Assessment, Balance of Risks**

The BCB made just a few additional remarks on the scenario assessment, in comparison to last week’s policy statement.

The COPOM recognizes the upward inflation surprises of late, with a high headline CPI also expected for December, on the heels of an extraordinary price collection of school tuition costs (possibly capturing an end to pandemic-related discounts) and the upward revision of the electricity tariff-flag to Red 2 (the highest bracket for an extra-charge based on hydrological and short-term market conditions). The authority “maintains the diagnosis that the current shocks are temporary, but continues to monitor closely its evolution, in particular, the core inflation readings” (paragraph 5).

On activity, the BCB reaffirms that “recent indicators suggest the uneven recovery in economic activity continues, as expected” (paragraph 2). The board discusses on the sectoral asymmetry of the output gap, as “the Committee believes that the pandemic continues to have heterogeneous effects on different economic sectors.” According to the COPOM, government transfers have reduced slacks in the goods sector, but with services still struggling with lower demand (especially in case of segments more impacted by social distancing measures). The BCB indicates that “the evolution of these sectoral gaps will depend on the pandemic evolution and on the adjustment in public spending” (paragraph 13). The authority also believes that “the risks associated with the pandemic evolution may imply a domestic scenario characterized by an even more gradual recovery” (paragraph 12).

We believe those remarks on activity indicate that the BCB is still concerned about the impact on the economic recovery from an expected fiscal cliff and an apparent second-wave of COVID-19, which continue to feed an unusually high level of uncertainty for upcoming monetary policy decisions.

On the global outlook, the BCB notes once again the contrast between the short-term activity impact from the pandemic resurgence in major economies and promising results from COVID-19 vaccine trials, improving the outlook for the medium term. With monetary stimulus expected to last long in advanced economies, amid the presence of economic slacks for a prolonged period, the BCB sees a backdrop of good liquidity and capital flows, meaning a favorable environment for emerging economies (paragraphs 1 and 11).

In the balance of risks, the COPOM cites the same elements, in both directions. On the upside (for inflation), the authority mentions that “an extension of fiscal policy responses to the pandemic that aggravates the fiscal path or a frustration with

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<sup>3</sup> Please refer to <https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/publications/focusmarketreadout>

<sup>4</sup> Our baseline scenario projects IPCA at 3.0% for 2021



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the continuation of the reform agenda may increase the risk premium". Fiscal risks are still seen implying an upward asymmetry in the balance of risks (paragraph 10). On the downside (for inflation), the COPOM claims that "economic slack may continue to produce a lower-than-expected prospective inflation trajectory, especially when the slack is concentrated in the service sector." The potential impact of the latter increases in case of precautionary savings following an eventually slower reversal of the pandemic (paragraph 9).

### **What to Expect Ahead?**

In our opinion, the BCB continues to set the stage for the elimination of the forward guidance (of stable interest rates if certain conditions are met) sometime in the 1H21. For now, we continue to believe that this future change will be driven by the natural switching of the policy horizon from end-2021 (when inflation is seen below the target with stable Selic rate next year) to end-2022 (when inflation is seen at the target, with some Selic rate hikes next year). Thus, this suggests that March is a more likely date than January for the removal of the forward guidance, in our view. The May meeting is also a candidate.

Looking ahead, we continue to envision a lack of demand-led price pressures for the relevant monetary policy horizon (i.e., medium term). Despite a surprisingly strong pickup in headline inflation recently, on the heels of temporary factors (food price shocks, change in consumer basket), the key fundamentals for monetary policy remain well behaved, with inflation expectations well anchored for the key policy horizons and with the economy expected to keep running below its potential for a considerable time (especially given the removal of emergency fiscal stimulus in 2021).

If these conditions materialize, and assuming there is no change in the credibility of the fiscal regime, we envision inflation below the mid-target for both 2021 and 2022. While we see room for downward revisions in the BCB's inflation projections at some point ahead, given our view on the fundamentals, we do hear the BCB's message and see risks of slightly sooner rate hikes than what we used to expect in our baseline scenario (we had been projecting stable Selic all across 2021).



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