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MONETARY POLICY PREVIEW

HOLDING INTEREST RATE STEADY WITH AN EYE ON FISCAL DECISIONS

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- The Copom — Monetary Policy Committee of the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) — gathers next week to announce its interest rate decision (Wednesday, December 7).
- In line with consensus, we expect the BCB to keep the Selic policy interest rate unchanged at 13.75%. In its accompanying statement, we believe the BCB will make no material changes in the main policy signals, maintaining the indication that it will assess "if the strategy of maintaining the Selic rate for a sufficiently long period will be enough to ensure the convergence of inflation."
- Fiscal developments have generated a good deal of volatility in Brazilian assets of late, and there is little clarity about the outlook. Although we believe that upcoming BCB communications (i.e., Copom statement, minutes and inflation report) could show a heightened tone regarding fiscal risks, we believe a change in the course of monetary policy is premature at this time.
- In general, we believe the evolution of the macroeconomic data and outlook since the October Copom meeting does not yet provide clear evidence for the BCB to decide now to abort its strategy of keeping interest rates at the current (contractionary) level to achieve its objective of bringing inflation to around the mid-target for the relevant policy horizon (mid-2024).
- As for the balance of risks, it is possible that the BCB will continue to (implicitly) hint at a lack of bias, although our assessment has been that upward asymmetry prevails, given the greater persistence of upside risk factors versus downside risk elements. In our view, the recent rise in perceptions of fiscal risk would make it appropriate for the BCB to send an even sharper signal about the consequences for monetary policy of the fiscal policies currently under debate.
- While the ongoing deceleration in real activity is in line with the BCB's scenario, the level of economic slack remains a major question mark and a source of uncertainty: our estimates point to an output gap that is much tighter than the BCB estimates presented in the last inflation report (as of 3Q22). Despite the methodological difficulties involving the calculation of unobserved variables (such as potential GDP and the structural unemployment), an apparent erosion of economic slack is an important factor that could generate the risk of even more persistent inflation going forward, in our view, especially bearing in mind the amount of fiscal stimulus in the pipeline.
- We continue to believe that any deviation from the flight plan (of rate stability for an extended period) would require the materialization of a scenario (and hypotheses) much different from the BCB's. For now, we continue to pencil in rate cuts only in 2H23, taking the Selic down to 12% for YE2023 — and we believe the risk for the Selic path is skewed to the upside.

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SOME BACKGROUND ON THE LATEST POLICY MOVES AND SIGNALS

At its October meeting, the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) maintained the Selic policy rate at 13.75%, as widely expected. In terms of policy signals, there were no changes from the previous communications: the authority continued to pledge to "remain vigilant" and assess "if the strategy of maintaining the Selic rate for a sufficiently long period will be enough to ensure the convergence of inflation".

The BCB still seems confident in its forecasts for now. On that occasion, the BCB estimated that the "12-month inflation projection for the second quarter of 2024 [at 3.2%], in the scenario using the interest rate trajectory extracted from the Focus survey [i.e., Selic rate at 13.75% for YE2022, 11.25% for YE2023, 8.00% for YE2024], remains consistent with the strategy of inflation convergence to around the target over the relevant horizon." Judging from the tone of the last Copom meeting, we believe the BCB was trying to curb any eventual market enthusiasm about the pace of disinflation and the timing to start cutting interest rates.

In the statement[1], the balance of risk assessment brought no new elements and apparently continued to signal a lack of bias by the BCB. In the scenario assessment, there were only a few noteworthy changes, but with no impact on the policy signaling. The Copom sounded a bit less sanguine on economic activity, noting a certain loss of steam of late, and continued to show skepticism about the ongoing decline in headline and underlying CPI numbers. The BCB also remains worried about global macro developments, citing the tightening in global financial conditions and the market's sensitivity to changes in fiscal fundamentals as developments that need close monitoring by emerging economies.

In the minutes[2], the BCB said it will continue to pay special attention to the evolution of the output gap, activity projections, and services inflation. In the BCB's assessment, the risks "remain high, requiring continuous monitoring and serenity in their assessment" regarding the inflation outlook. The Copom "considers that there has been some decrease in the estimated slack since its latest update", but the authority continues to estimate "an increase in slack throughout the monetary policy horizon, as a result of the monetary adjustment undertaken in recent quarters." The BCB pointed to "a more moderate pace of growth" in the data that "contribute[s] to the assessment of the degree of slack" and notes the initial impact of monetary policy on bank lending and on broader economic activity. On inflation, the authority continues to recognize that CPI remains high, as the BCB sees "the inflation of the components more sensitive to the economic cycle and the monetary policy, which present greater inflationary inertia" still running above the target.

THE CONTEXT FOR THE DECEMBER MEETING

We believe the evolution of the macroeconomic data and outlook since the October Copom meeting does not yet provide clear evidence for the BCB to decide now to abort its strategy of keeping interest rates at the current (contractionary) level to achieve its objective of bringing inflation to around the mid-target for the relevant policy horizon (mid-2024).

Regarding the international scenario, the outlook remains quite challenging for emerging markets, given the worsening of global financial conditions and the prospect of a slowing world economy. While the latest U.S. inflation reports point to some softening in price trends, core inflation numbers are still moving at an uncomfortably rapid pace. In our view, this CPI inflexion could allow the Federal Reserve to ease the size of hikes at its December meeting (to 50 bps), but the U.S. monetary authority has signaled a continuation of the tightening process. Indeed, the recent message from the Fed is that the expected terminal Fed Funds rate for the cycle will be higher than the one projected in the September dot plot. Other major central banks are also signaling further monetary tightening ahead — notably the European Central Bank (ECB). In China, economic activity also continues to disappoint into 4Q22, reflecting a renewed spread of COVID-19 cases and the tight government policies to curb contagion. Overall, recent data and events continue to herald a coming slowdown in major economies. Alongside tighter global monetary and financial conditions, this will produce a highly challenging environment for emerging economies in the coming months. That could appear to be a

[1] **Santander Brazil Monetary Policy: "Copom Decision: *The Strategy Remains the Same*** – October 26, 2022 – Available on: https://bit.ly/Std-COPOM-oct22

[2] **Santander Brazil Monetary Policy: "*Copom Minutes: Just Watching, For Now*** – November 1, 2022 – Available on: https://bit.ly/Std-COPOM-min-oct22

disinflationary global environment for the Brazilian economy, but the materialization of any positive effect on the local CPI could also hinge on the strength of the fundamentals of the Brazilian economy, especially on the fiscal side.

In Brazil, the latest activity numbers point to a still robust economy this year. According to the GDP report just recently released, the economy expanded 0.4% QoQ in 3Q22[3]. While this is shy of consensus and our own estimates (0.6% and 0.9%, respectively) the real GDP series was revised considerably higher from late 2020 onward, showing the seasonally adjusted real GDP level 1.2% higher than in the 2Q22 GDP report. The numbers indicate that domestic demand, which grew 0.7% in 3Q22, has expanded at an average hefty pace of ~4% QoQ-saar since 3Q21, way faster than our estimate for the potential GDP (~1.5%).

There are preliminary signs of reduced impetus in the economy and the labor market in 2H22, especially in 4Q22, probably reflecting tight monetary policy (in place since October 2021[4]) as well as contractionary financial conditions. According to the data out in the last couple of months, the labor market is now experiencing a slowing pace of job creation, even as the trend continues to run above the "neutral" level of payroll growth for joblessness (which we calculate at ~110k per month). In October[5], the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate reached 8.5%, the lowest level since mid-2015, and we could still see a slight decrease before it begins in 2H23 to return to its long-term level (which we calculate at ~10--11%). Elsewhere, the activity data also points to weakness in the goods-related sectors, whereas services maintain good momentum. We continue to foresee a slowdown in overall activity, especially from 4Q22 onward, with a resilient labor market and the effects of fiscal stimuli possibly helping mitigate and somewhat push back to a later time the impact of the contractionary monetary policy.

The deceleration in economic activity is in line with the BCB's scenario, as mentioned in the latest set of formal communications (October Copom statement and minutes). However, the level of economic slack remains a major question mark and a source of uncertainty: our estimates point to an output gap that is much tighter than the BCB estimates presented in the last inflation report (as of 3Q22). With the new GDP series, we (preliminarily) calculate that the economy could have run about 1.5 pp above its potential in 3Q22, with the output gap having fully closed in 1Q22. These estimates contrast with the BCB numbers presented in the 3Q22 inflation report, as the BCB expected the economy to run a bit more than 1 pp below its potential in 3Q22. Despite the methodological challenges involving the calculation of unobserved variables (such as potential GDP and structural unemployment), the erosion of economic slack is an important risk that could generate even more inflationary persistence going forward, especially in a context of large fiscal stimulus.

On the inflation front, we have once again observed mixed developments in recent weeks: on the one hand, the incoming data showed acceleration (or a resurgence) in prices that had been dampened by the tax cuts, especially in the case of fuel; on the other hand, year-on-year headline IPCA and the sequential trend in its core measures continue to lose steam. It should be noted, however, that the key cyclical core inflation gauges such as the IPCA EX3 — which includes industrial and services prices that are more sensitive to economic activity—was moving at a sequential annualized clip of 10% in October. That is a level that is highly incompatible with meeting the mid-point inflation target in the medium term.

Current inflation data, trends in volatile items, and expectations surrounding decisions on fuel taxes seem to have had an impact on short-term inflation expectations, as the median of analysts' IPCA projections have risen for both 2022 and 2023 since the October Copom. For longer horizons (2024 and 2025), no changes were seen, despite the market's adverse reaction to news related to the discussions of Budget 2023 and the early proposals for a new fiscal framework. Inflation for 2024 is still projected by analysts to be above the target (3.5%; mid-target: 3.0%). That said, we expect little change in the BCB's inflation projections for the relevant policy horizon, which should continue to point to inflation around the mid-target in 2Q24 — the focal policy horizon now. At the last Copom meeting, the BCB estimated IPCA at 3.2% for that horizon, about

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[3] **Santander Brazil Economic Activity: "*Stronger GDP Growth Expected for 3Q22*"** – December 01, 2022 – Available on: https://bit.ly/Std-GDP-3Q22

[4] Although the last tightening cycle began in March 2021, we calculate the Selic rate has only reached contractionary territory in October 2021. We believe this is the moment one should take as the starting point (t=0) to count the lags of monetary policy (i.e., its effects in the economy).

[5] **Santander Brazil Labor Market: "*Slower Employment Expansion, with Lower Participation Rate*"**– November 30, 2022 – Available on: https://bit.ly/Std-labor-113022

in line with the calendar-adjusted target for 2Q24, which we calculate at 3.13%. Regarding the calendar-adjusted measures of inflation expectations, we estimate that the median 18-month-ahead IPCA projections inched up to 4.25% (from 4.22% on the eve of the last policy meeting), now standing ~1.13 pp above the adjusted target.

The relatively mild increase in IPCA expectations, in contrast with a stronger market reaction, could be (at least in part) explained by the fact that analysts started pushing back somewhat their expectations for the timing of rate cuts. Now the kickoff for an eventual easing cycle is seen by consensus as taking place at the fifth Copom meeting of 2023 (August), which remains our own call, no longer at the fourth meeting (June). The upshot is an upward revision of 25-50 bps for the projected Selic path from mid-2023 to late 2024. We interpret this shift in forecasts as a reflection of the potential worsening of trade-offs for the BCB amid a perception of increased fiscal risk. The latter has already been considered and mentioned in recent speeches by BCB officials[6].

Fiscal developments have generated a good deal of volatility in Brazilian assets of late, particularly in the yield curve, which has shifted upward and built considerable premium, amid discussions of stimulus in the context of a likely lack of spare capacity in the economy. There is high uncertainty and little clarity about the final shape of the fiscal waiver and budgetary framework to be proposed for the coming years. Although we believe that the BCB's communications for the coming weeks (i.e., Copom statement, minutes, and inflation report) could show a heightened tone regarding fiscal risks — especially when it comes to the balance of risk analysis — we believe that a change in the course of monetary policy is premature at this time. Therefore, for now we see no change in the scenario that would lead the BCB to alter its strategy of keeping interest rates at contractionary levels for a sufficiently prolonged period.

Financial conditions in Brazil were mixed in October, with the impact of higher (global and local) interest rates mitigated by the trends in other assets[7]. Overall, we have continued to see contractionary financial conditions in Brazil since 2Q22, and the perception of fiscal risks could make the contributions of asset prices to the economy even more contractionary at any given level of the Selic policy rate. The BRL has also experienced high volatility this month, yet we think the BCB will likely use a starting point for the FX rate close to USD/BRL 5.35 (as per the rule based on the average of the week before the Copom meeting). From the standpoint of BCB inflation forecasts for the relevant policy horizon (18 months ahead), using such a departure point for the FX rate as an input is not materially different from the assumption used by the Copom at the last policy meeting (USD/BRL 5.25). This implies notably limited FX rate influence on the official IPCA estimates for the policy horizon.

WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FOR THE MEETING AND FUTURE STEPS?

In line with consensus, we expect the BCB to keep the Selic policy interest rate at 13.75% at the Copom meeting taking place on December 6-7. In the accompanying statement, we believe the BCB will make no material changes in the main policy signals. In our view, the Copom is likely to maintain the indication that it will assess "if the strategy of maintaining the Selic rate for a sufficiently long period will be enough to ensure the convergence of inflation." We also think the BCB will try to strengthen somewhat further the signal that it "will not hesitate to resume the tightening cycle if the disinflationary process does not proceed as expected", maintaining the message that the Copom will remain "vigilant" regarding the next steps. For now, however, the flight plan has interest rates on hold for an extended period.

As for the balance of risks, it is possible that the BCB will continue to (implicitly) hint at a lack of bias, **although our assessment has been that upward asymmetry still prevails**, especially given the greater persistence of upside factors versus downside risk elements. In our view, the recent rise in perceptions of fiscal risk makes it appropriate to send an even sharper signal about the consequences for monetary policy (and the broader economy) of the fiscal policies currently being debated.

[6] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-11/central-bank-chief-warns-that-brazil-needs-fiscal-equilibrium
[7] **Santander Brazil Economic Activity: "*Economic Activity: Financial Conditions Remain Critically Restrictive*"** – November 30, 2022 – https://bit.ly/Std-FCI-nov22

Figure 1. Santander Selic Forecast (% pa)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.

Figure 2. Historical, Expected BCB Moves (% pp)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.

We continue to believe any deviation from the flight plan (of rate stability for long) would require a significantly different reality than the BCB's hypotheses and scenario. So, as the monetary authority closely watches the fiscal policy debate, we still see it dealing with inflation risks by "autonomously" making its monetary stance more contractionary over time, with its policy steps lagging the gradual pace of decline in inflation expectations. Our scenario anticipates that 2Q23 will see the tightest monetary policy stance in 20 years.

We continue to pencil in a Selic rate at 13.75% throughout 1H23, as we see the room for immediate cuts narrowed by cyclical elements that could generate risks of resilient inflation for the medium term (namely, fiscal stimulus in the context of no slack in either the economy or employment). We forecast rate cuts only in 2H23 and look for a Selic rate at 12.00% for YE2023 and 9.00% for YE2024. This likely means a tight monetary stance until 2024, and **the risks regarding our scenario for interest rates are skewed to the upside.**

Refer to a summary of the Copom dataset and the following graphs.

Figure 3. Calendar-Adjusted IPCA Estimates, Target
(18 months ahead)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.
Note 1: IPCA expectations and target adjusted for the weight of each calendar-year as a policy horizon. For 4Q22, this means 50% for 2023 and 50% for 2024.
Note 2: Figures for the end of month. For November 2022 up to the 25th.

Figure 4. Median Selic Rate Expectations
(% annual, monthly path)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Bloomberg, Santander.
Note: As of the most recent BCB Focus report: November 25, 2022.

Figure 5. Median Selic Rate Expectations
(% annual)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.
Note: As of the most recent BCB Focus report: November 25, 2022.

Figure 6. Median IPCA Inflation Expectations
(% annual)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.
Note 1: As of the most recent BCB Focus report: November 25, 2022.

Figure 7. Real Rates: Short Term vs. Long Term
(monthly average, % annual)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Bloomberg, Santander.
Note 1: The neutral rate proxy is based on long-term real yields (5y5y forwards) adjusted by a constant historical term premium of 100bps.
Note 2: Average data for November 2022 up to the 25th.

Figure 8. Estimated Monetary Policy Stance
(gap between long- and short-term real rates)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Bloomberg, Santander.
Note 1: To calculate the policy stimulus, we subtract from the real policy rate the real level of neutral rate proxy (see graph on the left side).
Note 2: Average data for November 2022 up to the 25th.

Figure 9. Proxy for the Copom Dataset, Part 1

ECONOMIC TOPIC	LATEST DATA		THIS MEETING	MOST RECENT	PREVIOUS
Key Variables	*As of*		*Nov-22*	*Oct-22*	*Sep-22*
INFLATION					
Forecasts (% p.a.) - BCB's Focus report					
Calendar-Weighted Forecast (~18 months)	25-Nov-22		4.25	4.22	4.63
Calendar-Weighted Target (~18 months)	25-Nov-22		*3.13*	*3.13*	*3.19*
Calendar-Weighted Expectations Gap	25-Nov-22		*1.13*	*1.09*	*1.45*
Forecast for a year ahead (12 months)	25-Nov-22		5.27	5.14	5.10
Forecast for 2022 - target: 3.50%	25-Nov-22		5.91	5.60	6.00
Forecast for 2023 - target: 3.25%	25-Nov-22		5.02	4.94	5.01
Forecast for 2024 - target: 3.00%	25-Nov-22		3.50	3.50	3.50
Forecast for 2025 - target: 3.00%	25-Nov-22		3.00	3.00	3.00
Breakeven inflation rates (% p.a.)					
1-year	25-Nov-22		6.26	5.82	5.72
2-year	25-Nov-22		6.26	5.83	5.75
5-year	25-Nov-22		7.25	7.25	5.09
10-year	25-Nov-22		6.90	5.96	5.65
Actual CPI data					
Headline (% YoY)	Oct-22		6.5	7.2	8.7
Headline (% QoQ, saar)	Oct-22		-1.6	-4.6	-0.6
Core IPCA EX3 (% YoY)	Oct-22		11.3	11.5	11.3
Core IPCA EX3 (% QoQ, saar)	Oct-22		10.9	11.2	12.6
New cores average (% YoY)	Oct-22		9.7	10.1	10.4
New cores average (% QoQ, saar)	Oct-22		7.0	7.5	9.3
Diffusion index (sa, 3m)	Oct-22		65.8%	66.8%	68.6%
Diffusion index ex-food (sa, 3m)	Oct-22		66.1%	69.4%	72.0%
MONETARY POLICY					
Selic rate (% p.a.)					
Current level	25-Nov-22		13.75	13.75	13.75
Forecast for 2022	25-Nov-22		13.75	13.75	13.75
Forecast for 2023	25-Nov-22		11.50	11.25	11.25
Forecast for 2024	25-Nov-22		8.25	8.00	8.00
Forecast for 2025	25-Nov-22		8.00	7.75	7.50
Yield curve (% p.a.)					
1-year OIS swaps (pré-DI)	25-Nov-22		14.4	13.2	13.5
2-year OIS swaps (pré-DI)	25-Nov-22		13.9	12.0	12.1
Ex-ante real interest rate (% p.a.)					
1-year (OIS swaps vs. inflation forecast)	25-Nov-22		8.7	7.7	8.0
FISCAL POLICY					
Primary Fiscal Balance (% GDP)					
Forecast for 2022	25-Nov-22		1.2	1.0	0.8
Forecast for 2023	25-Nov-22		-0.8	-0.5	-0.5
Forecast for 2027	25-Nov-22		0.3	0.6	0.5
Forecast for 2030	25-Nov-22		0.9	1.0	0.9
Gross General Government Debt (% GDP)					
Forecast for 2022	25-Nov-22		77.0	77.6	78.2
Forecast for 2023	25-Nov-22		81.0	81.5	81.9
Forecast for 2027	25-Nov-22		88.4	86.8	86.8
Forecast for 2030	25-Nov-22		90.3	90.0	88.5

Sources: IBGE, FGV, Brazilian Central Bank, Anbima, Bloomberg, Santander.

Last update: November 30, 2022.

Figure 10. Proxy for the Copom Dataset, Part 2

ECONOMIC TOPIC	LATEST DATA		THIS MEETING	MOST RECENT	PREVIOUS
Key Variables	***As of***		***Nov-22***	***Oct-22***	***Sep-22***
REAL ACTIVITY					
GDP forecasts (% p.a.) - BCB's Focus report					
Forecast for 2022	25-Nov-22	↑	2.81	2.76	2.65
Forecast for 2023	25-Nov-22	↑	0.70	0.65	0.50
Forecast for 2024	25-Nov-22	↓	1.70	1.80	1.70
Forecast for 2025	25-Nov-22	→	2.00	2.00	2.00
Actual activity data					
IBC-Br (% QoQ, saar)	Sep-22	↑	5.5	4.8	3.7
Industrial production (% QoQ, saar)	Sep-22	↓	-1.3	-0.1	2.1
Retail sales (% QoQ, saar)	Sep-22	↓	-4.6	-9.3	-7.3
Services volume (% QoQ, saar)	Sep-22	↑	12.7	9.5	8.1
Unemployment rate (% 3m, SA)	Oct-22	↓	8.5	8.7	8.9
Real average wage (% YoY, 3m)	Oct-22	↑	2.5	-0.6	-2.9
Real wage bill (% YoY, 3m)	Oct-22	↑	9.9	7.7	6.1
Caged payrolls (thousands, SA, 3m)	Oct-22	↑	131	143	176
Economic confidence (2011=100)	Nov-22	↓	84.5	88.9	90.6
EXTERNAL SECTOR					
FX rate (USD/BRL)					
Current level	25-Nov-22	↑	5.40	5.38	5.17
Actual: 5-day average (previous week)	25-Nov-22	↑	5.35	5.23	5.19
USD/BRL (to be) used in simulations	25-Nov-22	↑	5.35	5.25	5.20
Forecast for 2022	25-Nov-22	↑	5.27	5.20	5.20
Forecast for 2023	25-Nov-22	↑	5.25	5.20	5.20
Forecast for 2024	25-Nov-22	↑	5.20	5.10	5.11
Forecast for 2025	25-Nov-22	↑	5.20	5.15	5.15
Current account balance (USD Billions, 12m)					
Current level (12-month rolling)	Oct-22	↓	-58.2	-54.0	-52.5
Forecast for 2022	25-Nov-22	↓	-44.1	-33.1	-26.5
Forecast for 2023	25-Nov-22	↓	-39.8	-34.0	-32.0
Forecast for 2024	25-Nov-22	↓	-43.6	-38.6	-36.5
Forecast for 2025	25-Nov-22	↑	-38.5	-40.0	-39.2
ASSET PRICES					
Santander Brasil's financial conditions index*	**Nov-22**	↓	**1.3**	**1.5**	**1.2**
IC-Br (% YoY)	Oct-22	↓	-1.7	13.4	17.7
CRB Commodity Index (Futures, USD terms)	Nov-22	↓	273	277	278
CRB Commodity Index (Futures, BRL terms)	25-Nov-22	↓	1,472	1,484	1,442
CRB Commodities in BRL: 50-day average	25-Nov-22	↑	1,464	1,457	1,485
Brent Oil Price (USD bbl) / 1st Active Future	25-Nov-22	↓	84	94	87
Brazil 5-year CDS (basis-points)	25-Nov-22	↓	263	286	264
Ibovespa stock index (points)	25-Nov-22	↓	108,977	112,764	111,936
DI Jan-23 (% p.a.) / Futures	25-Nov-22	↑	13.70	13.68	13.74
DI Jan-24 (% p.a.) / Futures	25-Nov-22	↑	14.48	12.99	13.09
DI Jan-25 (% p.a.) / Futures	25-Nov-22	↑	13.90	11.92	11.74
NTN-F 2027 (% p.a.) / Pre-Fixed Rate	25-Nov-22	↑	13.65	12.00	11.65
NTN-F 2029 (% p.a.) / Pre-Fixed Rate	25-Nov-22	↑	13.71	12.16	11.72
NTN-B 2035 (% p.a.) / Inflation-Linked	25-Nov-22	↑	6.22	5.82	5.82
NTN-B 2055 (% p.a.) / Inflation-Linked	25-Nov-22	↑	6.22	5.86	5.88

Sources: IBGE, FGV, Brazilian Central Bank, Anbima, Bloomberg, Santander.

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