



BRAZIL MACRO

September 1, 2023

SPECIAL REPORT - CREDIT

Two Views on the Current State of The Credit Cycle

Henrique Danyi* henrique.danyi@santander.com.br +5511 3553 7350

- This study presents two views on the non-earmarked credit cycle brought to light by two credit gap measures: the outstanding credit-to-GDP ratio gap and another on new monthly loans gap.
- The gap between trend and actual non-earmarked outstanding credit-to-GDP for non-financial corporations reached -3.96% in July. This number is to be expected given the contractionary stance of monetary policy since the end of 2021. For households, the latest figure for non-earmarked outstanding credit-to-GDP shows a fall into negative territory (-0.89%) following months of positive numbers, illustrating that tight monetary policy is now finally beginning to impact households.
- The effects of monetary policy and slower economic activity are much more apparent when we look at the gap between trend and actual new loans for July. The gap for household lending sits at -0.48%, while its equivalent for non-financial corporations is -0.05%; both negative, but not as negative as they have been in the past.
- Comparing July our estimates of the lending gaps for both sectors with the previous 12-month numbers shows that lending to non-financial corporations felt the contractionary effects of tight monetary policy earlier than lending to households, just as the BCB has been suggesting, and in line with our reading of the scenario.
- In line with the credit-to-GDP gap, July's new lending gap shows that households have felt contractionary effects in the last couple of months. On the other hand (and in contrast with the credit-to-GDP gap for non-financial corporations which is significantly negative) the new lending gap for non-financial corporations is almost zero. As we see it, household have started feeling the lagged compressive effects of monetary policy at the margin while corporations are beginning to see the first signs of relief.
- These results support our belief that Brazil is currently experiencing a period of restrictive monetary policy, high consumer indebtedness, slowing economic activity, and record levels of non-performing loans (NPLs), all of which are exerting contractionary pressures on credit markets. Even so, we believe that these results also support our forecast for no 'credit crunch' this year, since, despite the gaps being negative, they are smaller than in previous periods.



Introduction

This study presents two views on non-earmarked credit cycle brought to light by two credit gap measures: the outstanding credit-to-GDP ratio gap and another on new monthly loans gap.

Tightness in the credit market is an important economic indicator. It captures both the effects of monetary and economic cycles in the credit markets and sums up the state of the financial system's health in a clear, and easy to understand measure.

In this report, we focus exclusively on the non-earmarked segment in credit markets. Our interest is in what the credit cycle is telegraphing about monetary and economic conditions. Since the earmarked segment is used for countercyclical or distributive purposes, it may be prone to distorting effects. For this reason, we have opted to exclude the earmarked segment from this analysis.

Our results for the outstanding credit-to-GDP and the new lending indicate negative gaps in July for non-earmarked credit for both households and non-financial corporations, albeit at a smaller level for outstanding household credit-to-GDP. These numbers are consistent with our reading that Brazil is currently experiencing a period of restrictive monetary policy, high consumer indebtedness, slowing economic activity, and record levels of non-performing loans (NPLs), all of which are exerting contractionary pressures on credit markets. They also support the Brazilian Central Bank's (BCB) view that the impact on in household credit in this latest monetary policy tightening cycle has been small.

Outstanding Credit-to-GDP Gap - BIS View

According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Quarterly Review of 1Q2014, Basel III guidelines advocate the use of the gap between credit-to-GDP as an indicator for macroprudential policy¹. Its usefulness comes from its ability to easily capture stress in credit markets, anticipating financial instability issues and acting as an early warning indicator for banking crises. Recently, De Moraes and Costa (2023) have shown that the credit gap measure is a good measure of risk to anticipate financial instability in Brazil². With that in mind, we present our estimates of the gaps below.

To make this section more useful, we have opted to untangle the data a little bit and show not only the headline non-earmarked outstanding credit-to-GDP results for households and non-financial corporations, but their main sub-components as well. This way, we can tell which sub-sectors in the segment have been responsible for the most significant exacerbating/offsetting pressures in each period.


As a technical note, it is important to point out that to attenuate/amend endpoint bias in the HP filtering process, we extend each series by 18 months using ARIMA forecasts on their differences (discarded after filtering for presentation). Below, we present our results for each category together with a brief discussion.

¹ See Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014), *The credit-to-GDP gap and countercyclical capital buffers: questions and answers* - BIS Quarterly Review at https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1403g.pdf.

² See Moraes and Costa (2023), *Credit behavior and financial stability in an emerging economy* - Economic Systems 47 at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0939362522000619.


1

Figure 1 – Non-earmarked Outstanding Credit-to-GDP Gap for Households (% of Potential)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.

Figure 2 – Non-earmarked Outstanding Credit-to-GDP Gap for Non-financial Corporations (% of Potential)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.

From Figure 2, as of July, non-financial corporations presented substantially below trend results (-3.96%), with the main drivers for this effect being discount of trade bills and receivables (-1.65%) and working capital financing (-1.63%). These numbers are to be expected given the contractionary stance of monetary policy since the end of 2021. What is more of a surprise is that the same does not hold for our household credit result (see Figure 1). This suggests that the effects of the tight monetary policy have not disrupted the credit market for households. However, the most recent data has shown a reversal of the households' gap and it now sits at negative territory (-0.89%), indicating that monetary policy has merely been operating with a lagged effect.

Credit Concessions Gap - BCB View

In its most recent Inflation Report, the BCB proposed a methodology to estimate the non-earmarked credit lending cycle³. Their procedure is the following:

- 1. Extract an initial estimate of a gap from monthly new loan numbers using a standard HP filter (as done in the previous exercise);
- 2. Use the initial gap estimate as a dependent variable on a regression with the output gap and real rate gap (and, potentially, their lags) as the explanatory variables; and
- 3. Extract the fitted values from the previous step as the final estimate of the credit concessions gap and extend the series using the dependent variables as feeds to the estimated model.

In the original proposal, the BCB used quarterly seasonally- and inflation-adjusted data for lending ranging from 2003 to 2019 for steps 1 and 2, and then extending until 1Q23 for step 3. We, on the other hand, make slight alterations to the approach. We use monthly data from 03M11 to 06M23, and we are not worried about overfitting issues. Our focus is solely on the lending gap that is closely related to monetary and economic cycles. Therefore, we use our whole sample in step 2 and extract only the fitted values in step 3⁴. To circumvent the potential disruptive effects of the pandemic on our analysis, we include in step 2 a covid-19 dummy on the regressions. Thus, the estimated equations in step 2 are:

$$y_t = c + \gamma d_t + \sum_{j=0}^{N} \beta^j x_{t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^{N} \delta^j (r_{t-j} - r_{t-j}^*) + \varepsilon_t,$$


³ See *Cycles of credit granting with non-earmarked resources and of economic activity* - BCB Inflation Report 2Q23 at https://www.bcb.gov.br/content/ri/inflationreport/202306/ri202306b3i.pdf.

⁴ Despite these modifications, the model used still cannot be seen as a causal relationship between the metrics, as is the case in the BCB's approach.




where y_t is the initial estimate of the non-earmarked new lending gap in month t for either households or non-financial corporations, d_t is the covid dummy parameter, x_t is Santander's estimate of the output gap, r_t is the ex-ante real policy rate, and r_t^* is Santander's estimate of the natural real rate. We have evaluated several possibilities for N ranging from 0 to 12 to determine the regressors lags and used, as the BCB did, the Akaike Information Criterium (AIC) to choose among the possibilities considered.

Figure 3 – Non-earmarked New Loans to Households (log and log trend)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.

Figure 4 – Non-earmarked New Loans to Non-Financial Corporations (log and log trend)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.

Even in this early stage, the initial estimates of trends paint a picture of the evolution of new lending in Brazil (see Figures 3 and 4). In the last 10 years, the non-earmarked sector has been able to grow steadily and substantially for households. For non-financial corporations, the same did not hold, as advances in capital markets created competition in funding for the national financial system.

Contrary to our previous credit gaps, the new lending gap estimate results are extremely volatile (see Figures 5 and 6). This is to be expected, since the underlying variables are flows as opposed to stockflow ratios used in the last section. Still, when considering the relationship between the new lending gap and monetary and economic cycles, one should expect a smoother gap estimate. For this reason, we continue our analysis following the methodology presented before.

Figure 5 – Non-earmarked New Loans to Households Initial Gap (% of Potential)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.

Figure 6 – Non-earmarked New Loans to Non-Financial Corporations Initial Gap (% of Potential)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.

1

Figure 7 – Non-earmarked New Loans to Households Gap (% of Potential)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.

Figure 8 – Non-earmarked New Loans to Non-Financial Corporations Gap (% of Potential)



Sources: Brazilian Central Bank, Santander.

Our final estimates of the new lending gaps paint a much smoother picture than the initial estimate (see Figures 7 and 8). Also, the effects of monetary and economic activity cycles are much more apparent here when compared to our credit-to-GDP gaps from Figures 5 and 6. As of July, the gap for household new lending sits at -0.48%, while its equivalent for non-financial corporations is -0.05%. Thus, both are now in negative territory, but not as negative as they have been in the past. Like the results from figures 1 and 2, figures 7 and 8 also serve as evidence that new lending to non-financial corporations has felt the contractionary effects of the tight monetary policy earlier than new lending to households. This is consistent with the BCB's communications, both in the Inflation Report and in interviews/presentations made by board members.

In line with the credit-to-GDP gap, July's new lending gap shows that households have felt contractionary effects in the last couple of months. On the other hand (and in contrast with the credit-to-GDP gap for non-financial corporations which is significantly negative) the new lending gap for non-financial corporations is almost zero. As we see it, household have started feeling the lagged compressive effects of monetary policy at the margin while corporations are beginning to see the first signs of relief.

Concluding Remarks

The figures presented here can easily capture and provide timely evidence on credit market conditions. We have found negative gaps as of July for non-earmarked credit for both households and non-financial corporations using two methodologies. These results support our belief that Brazil is currently experiencing a period of restrictive monetary policy, high consumer indebtedness, slowing economic activity, and record levels of non-performing loans (NPLs), all of which are exerting contractionary pressures on credit markets. Even so, we believe that these results also support our forecast for no 'credit crunch' this year, given the improvement in non-financial corporation lending.



CONTACTS / IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES

Daniil Manaa Dana	onel.		
Brazil Macro Resea			
Ana Paula Vescovi*	Chief Economist	anavescovi@santander.com.br	5511-3553-8567
Jankiel Santos*	Economist – External Sector	jankiel.santos@santander.com.br	5511-3012-5726
Ítalo Franca*	Economist – Fiscal Policy	italo.franca@santander.com.br	5511-3553-5235
Daniel Karp Vasquez*	Economist – Inflation	daniel.karp@santander.com.br	5511-3553-9828
Adriano Valladao Ribeiro* Tomas Urani*	Economist – Inflation Economist – Global Economics	adriano.ribeiro@santander.com.br tomas.urani@santander.com.br	5511-3553-7495 5511-3553-9520
			5511-3553-7350
Henrique Danyi* Felipe Kotinda*	Economist – Credit & Monetary Policy Economist – Commodities	henrique.danyi@santander.com.br felipe.kotinda@santander.com.br	5511-3553-7350
Gabriel Couto*	Economist – Commodities Economist – Activity	gabriel.couto@santander.com.br	5511-3553-8487
Gilmar Lima*	Economist – Modeling	gilmar.lima@santander.com.br	5511-3553-6327
Ana Julia Carvalho	Economist – Modeling Economist – Special Projects	ana.carvalho.silva@santander.com.br	5511-3553-8071
Global Macro Rese		ana.sarvamo.siiva@sananasi.som.si	0011 0000 0071
Maciej Reluga*	Head Macro, Rates & FX Strategy - CEE	maciej.reluga@santander.pl	48-22-534-1888
Rodrigo Park *	Economist – Argentina	rpark@santander.com.ar	54-11-4341-1272
Ana Paula Vescovi*	Economist – Brazil	anavescovi@santander.com.br	5511-3553-8567
Juan Pablo Cabrera*	Economist – Chile	jcabrera@santander.cl	562-2320-3778
Guillermo Aboumrad*	Economist – Mexico	gjaboumrad@santander.com.mx	5255-5257-8170
Piotr Bielski*	Economist – Poland	piotr.bielski@santander.pl	48-22-534-1888
Mike Moran	Head of Macro Research, US	mike.moran@santander.us	212-350-3500
Fixed Income Rese	earch		
Juan Arranz*	Chief Rates & FX Strategist – Argentina	jarranz@santanderrio.com.ar	5411-4341-1065
Juan Pablo Cabrera*	Chief Rates & FX Strategist – Chile	jcabrera@santander.cl	562-2320-3778
Equity Research			
Miguel Machado*	Head Equity Research Americas	mmachado@santander.com.mx	5255 5269 2228
Alan Alanis*	Head, Mexico	aalanis@santander.com.mx	5552-5269-2103
Andres Soto	Head, Andean	asoto@santander.us	212-407-0976
Walter Chiarvesio*	Head, Argentina	wchiarvesio@santanderrio.com.ar	5411-4341-1564
Aline de Souza Cardoso*	Head, Brazil	aline.souza.cardoso@santander.com.br	5511-3553-1684
Electronic			

Bloomberg SIEQ <GO>
Reuters Pages SISEMA through SISEMZ

This report has been prepared by Santander Investment Securities Inc. ("SIS"; SIS is a subsidiary of Santander Holdings USA, Inc. which is wholly owned by Banco Santander, S.A. "Santander"), on behalf of itself and its affiliates (collectively, Grupo Santander) and is provided for information purposes only. This document must not be considered as an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any relevant securities (i.e., securities mentioned herein or of the same issuer and/or options, warrants, or rights with respect to or interests in any such securities). Any decision by the recipient to buy or to sell should be based on publicly available information on the related security and, where appropriate, should take into account the content of the related prospectus filed with and available from the entity governing the related market and the company issuing the security. This report is issued in Spain by Santander Investment Bolsa, Sociedad de Valores, S.A. ("Santander Investment Bolsa"), and in the United Kingdom by Banco Santander, S.A., London Branch. Santander London is authorized by the Bank of Spain. This report is not being issued to private customers. SIS, Santander London and Santander Investment Bolsa are members of Grupo Santander.

ANALYST CERTIFICATION: The following analysts hereby certify that their views about the companies and their securities discussed in this report are accurately expressed, that their recommendations reflect solely and exclusively their personal opinions, and that such opinions were prepared in an independent and autonomous manner, including as regards the institution to which they are linked, and that they have not received and will not receive direct or indirect compensation in exchange for expressing specific recommendations or views in this report, since their compensation and the compensation system applying to Grupo Santander and any of its affiliates is not pegged to the pricing of any of the securities issued by the companies evaluated in the report, or to the income arising from the businesses and financial transactions carried out by Grupo Santander and any of its affiliates: Henrique Danyi*.

*Employed by a non-US affiliate of Santander Investment Securities Inc. and not registered/qualified as a research analyst under FINRA rules, and is not an associated person of the member firm, and, therefore, may not be subject to the FINRA Rule 2242 and Incorporated NYSE Rule 472 restrictions on communications with a subject company, public appearances, and trading securities held by a research analyst account.

The information contained herein has been compiled from sources believed to be reliable, but, although all reasonable care has been taken to ensure that the information contained herein is not untrue or misleading, we make no representation that it is accurate or complete and it should not be relied upon as such. All opinions and estimates included herein constitute our judgment as at the date of this report and are subject to change without notice.

Any U.S. recipient of this report (other than a registered broker-dealer or a bank acting in a broker-dealer capacity) that would like to effect any transaction in any security discussed herein should contact and place orders in the United States with SIS, which, without in any way limiting the foregoing, accepts responsibility (solely for purposes of and within the meaning of Rule 15a-6 under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934) for this report and its dissemination in the United States.

© 2020 by Santander Investment Securities Inc. All Rights Reserved.

